A Guide to the Domestic Violence (Prevention and Protection) Act, 2010 (DVPPA) in Bangladesh

The Statistical Urgency for a Legislative Shift

The landscape of domestic violence in Bangladesh presents a profound challenge to the principles of human rights and the rule of law. According to a survey conducted in 2024 by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the lifetime prevalence rate of violence against women stands at a staggering 76%. While other surveys, such as the 2015 BBS report, cited a lower figure of 57.7%, this discrepancy is widely interpreted by human rights experts as an underrepresentation fueled by a pervasive “culture of silence.” The gravity of this crisis is further illuminated by the MINIMat longitudinal cohort study, which identified a 70% revictimization rate, confirming that domestic violence is rarely an isolated event but a chronic cycle of abuse.

For decades, the state’s primary response was the Nari-O-Shishu Nirjatan Daman Act, 2000. However, as a strictly criminal and punitive instrument, this Act requires a “high evidentiary threshold” and focuses almost exclusively on the incarceration of the offender. This narrow focus often deters survivors who seek safety but fear the total dissolution of the family unit or the protracted nature of criminal trials. The enactment of the Domestic Violence (Prevention and Protection) Act, 2010 (DVPPA) marked a necessary jurisprudential shift. By establishing a “quasi-civil” safety net, the DVPPA prioritizes the immediate protection of the survivor through civil remedies, such as the right to reside in the marital home, rather than relying solely on the blunt instrument of criminal prosecution.

An Expanded Definition of Abuse

Section 3 of the Domestic Violence (Prevention and Protection) Act, 2010 explicitly defines four categories of domestic violence: physical abuse, sexual abuse, physiological abuse, and economic abuse.

• Physical Abuse: According to the DVPPA, physical abuse constitutes any act or conduct that is of such a nature as to cause bodily pain, harm, or danger to life, limb, or health or impair the health or development of the victim. Under this definition, physical abuse includes assault, criminal intimidation, and criminal force.
• Sexual Abuse: The Act outlines that sexual abuse is any conduct of a sexual nature that abuses, humiliates, degrades, or otherwise violates the dignity of the victim.
• Psychological Abuse: Under Section 3, psychological abuse is codified to include verbal insults, persistent harassment, and threats to the victim’s dignity or bodily integrity. This acknowledges that the destruction of a survivor’s mental autonomy is a distinct legal injury, providing a basis for protection orders even in the absence of visible physical trauma.
• Economic Abuse: The Act defines economic abuse as the deprivation of financial resources, assets, or basic necessities that the victim is entitled to by law or custom. This includes withholding the means for survival, denying access to shared household resources, or preventing the victim from utilizing her own property or earnings, effectively recognizing financial control as a tool of domestic subjugation.

It is evident that Section 3 of the DVPPA provides the most expansive definition of “domestic violence” in Bangladeshi history, moving beyond physical battery to recognize the trauma of non-physical coercion.

Nari-O-Shishu versus DVPPA

The legal frameworks of the Nari-O-Shishu Nirjatan Daman Act, 2000 and the DVPPA operate on fundamentally different jurisdictional assumptions. The 2000 Act is a criminal tool designed for the state-led punishment of offenders. Its reliance on the criminal standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt” often leaves survivors vulnerable when evidence is confined to the private sphere.

This evidentiary gap is starkly visible in cases like State vs. Md. Khalilur Rahman (2004), where the absence of independent witnesses in a private domestic setting often leads to the acquittal of the accused. When abuse occurs behind closed doors, meeting the high threshold of criminal proof is nearly impossible, as the “benefit of the doubt” frequently tips toward the perpetrator. By contrast, the DVPPA functions as a protective instrument that operates on a “balance of probabilities.” This means in regard to the DVPPA, the court must be satisfied it is “more likely than not” (greater than 50% chance) that the abuse occurred.

By lowering this bar, the 2010 Act allows the court to prioritize the likelihood of harm over the absolute certainty of a crime, offering civil remedies intended to mitigate future risk rather than simply punishing past acts. Crucially, the DVPPA offers a pathway for survivors to secure “Residence Orders,” ensuring they are not forced into homelessness for reporting their abuse, a common deterrent under the 2000 Act. While “Special Desks” in police stations were intended to bridge the gap for survivors, the DVPPA provides the formal judicial mechanism required to move domestic complaints out of the realm of informal mediation and into a rights-based framework. It allows for the preservation of family structures, in situations where it is safe to do so, providing a “quasi-civil” alternative for those who do not see criminal prosecution as the preferred or immediate goal.

Analyzing Institutional Inaction

The progressive potential of the DVPPA has been severely hamstrung by what can only be described as a “disavowal of state responsibility.” This enforcement gap is not merely a product of limited capacity, but of a failure of the due diligence standard by implementing agencies.

Institutional Disavowal and Lack of Ownership: A primary hurdle has been the three-year delay (2010–2013) in formulating and approving the Act’s Rules, which resulted in a critical lack of procedural awareness among judges and lawyers during the Act’s formative years. Furthermore, there is a distinct lack of ownership within the Ministry of Women and Children Affairs (MOWCA) and the Department of Women Affairs (DWA). Despite recent budget allocations ensuring these agencies are no longer “resource-starved,” officials frequently prioritize informal mediation, or salish, over the DVPPA. This preference for salish is often rooted in an institutionalized fear of “breaking families,” leading to the deliberate de-prioritization of the law’s protective measures.

Police Inaction and the Culture of Silence: The enforcement of the DVPPA is frequently obstructed by a pervasive “culture of silence,” wherein law enforcement agencies continue to categorize domestic violence as a “personal family matter” rather than a statutory violation. This systemic reluctance often manifests as a refusal to document complaints or a failure to refer survivors to the specific protections afforded by the 2010 Act. However, this institutional disavowal has been directly challenged by the judiciary. The High Court Division (Writ Petition No. 5541/2015) clarified that state inaction is not merely a social shortcoming but a breach of constitutional duty, affirming that the Government has a mandatory obligation to move domestic abuse from the private sphere into the realm of public legal accountability.

The catastrophic cost of failing to honor this duty is starkly illustrated in Md. Sukur Ali vs. The State (2016). While the judgment is a cornerstone of juvenile and sentencing jurisprudence, it serves as a grim evidentiary record of how unchecked domestic instability, left unaddressed by state intervention, can escalate into irreparable criminal harm. The court’s observation of “neglect and laches” in the earlier stages of such cases underscores a broader systemic failure to protect the vulnerable before a crisis reaches a capital threshold. Together, these precedents establish that judicial and police intervention under the DVPPA is not a matter of discretion, but a constitutional necessity to prevent the ultimate violation of the Right to Life (Article 32).

Backlash and Normative Resistance: The DVPPA faces significant social and institutional backlash. Legal practitioners and government authorities often delegitimize the law by labeling it an “NGO-led Act,” a pretext used to justify inaction by suggesting the law is an external imposition disconnected from Bangladeshi values. This labeling provides a convenient excuse for service providers to ignore their statutory duties, reinforcing the stereotype that domestic violence is a private conflict best resolved through the subjugation of the victim’s rights to the “sanctity” of the marriage.

Strategic Best Practices for Practitioners

To navigate this climate of institutional resistance, practitioners must adopt an aggressive, rights-based approach to enforcement. As such, strategic best practices for practitioners include the following measures:

• Prioritize Interim Orders (Section 13): Do not wait for a full hearing. Secure ex-parte interim protection orders under Section 13 to provide an immediate safety net, halting ongoing violence and establishing court jurisdiction before the perpetrator can exert further pressure.
• Evidence Preservation and Digital Logs: To overcome the dismissive attitudes toward “non-physical” abuse, counsel must guide clients in maintaining detailed logs of psychological harassment. This includes archiving digital communications, text messages, and screenshots to satisfy the evidentiary requirements for Section 3 violations.
• Invoke Section 34 for Accountability: Where enforcement officers or DWA officials demonstrate “deliberate inaction” or neglect their court-ordered duties, practitioners should invoke Section 34. This should be utilized as a basis for mandamus-style accountability or to initiate internal disciplinary proceedings against negligent officers.
• Strategic Use of Section 15 (Residence Orders): Counter the “homelessness trap” by asserting the victim’s right to remain in the marital home or demanding alternative accommodation. This is particularly vital in Hanafi legal contexts where hizanat (custody) and housing are often used as leverage against mothers.
• Multi-Agency Referral and 2013 Rules Compliance: Given MOWCA’s failure to institutionalize many support services, practitioners should demand the list of “enlisted providers” as mandated by the 2013 Rules. If the state fails to provide this, counsel should move the court to recognize private NGOs as interim service providers to ensure the survivor has access to necessary medical and psychological support.

Ultimately, the DVPPA 2010 represents a critical evolution in Bangladeshi jurisprudence, shifting the legal focus from retroactive punishment to the proactive preservation of human dignity and safety. By breaking the “culture of silence” through rigorous enforcement and judicial accountability, legal practitioners can transform these statutory provisions into a lived reality for survivors. The way forward requires a steadfast commitment to viewing domestic security not as a private privilege, but as a fundamental constitutional right that the state is mandated to protect.

At Sadat Sarwat and Associates, we assist clients in understanding their legal rights, available protections, and procedural options. We strive to deliver thoughtful and effective legal counsel grounded in both legal precision and compassion.

References:

The Domestic Violence (Prevention and Protection) Act, 2010
The Domestic Violence (Prevention and Protection) Rules, 2013
Nari-O-Shishu Nirjatan Daman Ain, 2000 (Amended 2003)
‘It’s a Family Matter’: Inaction and Denial of Domestic Violence (IDS Bulletin, 2024)
Transitions in women’s experience of physical domestic violence during 2001–2020: The MINIMat longitudinal cohort study (BMJ Global Health, 2026)
Public Prosecution System in Bangladesh: Issues of Justice for VAWG (AgCon/BRAC, 2022)
Country Profile on Universal Access to SRR: Bangladesh (ARROW/Naripokkho, 2017)
Contemporary Trends of Domestic Violence against Women in Bangladesh (Faruk Shah et al., 2019)
Three out of four women in Bangladesh experience violence, Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics survey finds
State vs. Md. Khalilur Rahman (2004)
Md. Sukur Ali Vs. The State (Supreme Court of Bangladesh, 2016)
High Court Division Judgment (Writ Petition No. 5541/2015)

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